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Civil procedure is a topic which  gains a great deal of attention from practitioners, judges, and commentators 
alike. Employment procedure cases generally 
do not, as it would appear the 2013 Employment 
Tribunals Rules of Procedure are a more  
niche topic with fewer broad questions of 
interpretation or justice. Nevertheless, some 
interesting procedural questions have been 
answered over the last 12 months, which 
practitioners should bear in mind.
Nursing & Midwifery Council v Harrold [2016] 
IRLR 30 is a notable recent case on civil restraint 
orders. It was held that the High Court could 
impose a civil restraint order in respect of claims 
to be brought in the employment tribunal using 
its inherent jurisdiction, despite the fact that the 
CPR (as amended) do not apply, since the ET is  
an inferior court. Such orders prevent vexation, 
oppression, and additionally prevent the 
unmeritorious waste of court resources, and  
as such give effect to the overriding objective.
Liddington v 2gether NHS Foundation Trust 
[2016] UKEAT 0002_16_2806 is a case involving a 
number of procedural issues, but one of the most 
relevant to practitioners is that costs orders for 
unreasonable conduct can be made even against 
litigants in person in the employment tribunal. 
Here, a repeated failure to properly particularise  
a claim was deemed unreasonable. 
Bhardwaj v FDA [2016] IRLR 789 is a Court of 
Appeal case considering the issue of alleged  
bias of an employment tribunal following the 
appointment of two members of the respondent 
company as lay members of the employment 
tribunals service. One had been appointed to the 
tribunal where the claimant’s case was to be heard 
(London Central), the other at London South. It 
later transpired that one of the lay members of the 
bench for the claimant’s case attended a training 
day with the newly appointed lay tribunal member 
from the London South tribunal. 
However, at the time of the hearing, the 
claimant was happy for the case to be heard 
despite the appointment of the two lay members 
from the respondent. The Court of Appeal held 
that the claimant had waived her right to object 
by agreeing for the hearing to go ahead, and that 
in any event the circumstances were not such  
that a ‘fair-minded and informed observer’ would 
conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. 
Fallows v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016]  
IRLR 827 involved a restricted reporting order  
in a case involving the former hairdresser to  
Sir Elton John, who was bringing a claim of  
sex discrimination and unfair dismissal, such a 
dispute obviously being of interest to the press.  
A restricted reporting order was made as the claim 
included an allegation of sexual misconduct, but 
the claim was withdrawn following an agreement 
being made between the parties. 
News Group Newspapers applied for, and was 
granted, the revocation of the order, which was 
subsequently appealed. It was held that settlement 
and withdrawal of a claim does not result in the 
automatic lapse of a restricted reporting order 
(unlike the promulgation of a decision) and that 
the 2013 Rules permitted the ET to grant a 
permanent restricted reporting order, rather  
than one limited to the life of the proceedings. 
Time limits
In Rathakrishnan v Pizza Express (Restaurants) Ltd 
[2016] IRLR 278, acceptance of an out-of-time 
discrimination claim (17 days late on grounds  
of the claimant’s diabetes) was considered by  
the EAT. HHJ Peter Clark ruled that applications 
should be decided under a ‘multi-factoral 
approach’ in keeping with the tribunal’s wide ‘just 
and equitable’ test. The discretion should be wide, 
and ‘no single factor [should be] determinative’.
Another case on the subject of time limits  
is Sheredes School v Davies [2016] UKEAT 
0196_16_1309, this time relating to an unfair 
dismissal (decided under the more stringent 
‘reasonably practicable’ test). On 8 October 2015, 
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the employee’s solicitors advised him to seek  
new solicitors in relation to the claim but failed to 
inform him that the time limit for his claim was due 
to expire on 25 October 2015. On 14 October 2015, 
the SRA intervened in the matter, preventing the 
solicitors from dealing with the case. The employee 
sought advice elsewhere on 5 November 2015 and 
brought a claim, with the help of his wife, on 10 
November 2015 (without having all his papers, his 
file having been retained by his original solicitors).
In this case, because ‘there can really be no 
argument that they ought to have been advised 
on that occasion [8 October 2015] of the urgent 
need present a claim; nor can there be any doubt 
that, if they had been so advised, the claim could 
have been presented in time’, it would have been 
reasonably practicable for a claim to have been 
commenced in time, resulting in the EAT finding 
the claim ought not to be accepted. 
As HHJ Shanks put it, ‘I appreciate that this 
outcome is likely to be very disappointing, if not 
baffling, [to the claimants]. The only consolation  
I can offer is that they may well… have a claim 
against [their solicitors] in respect of the loss of  
an opportunity to bring a claim’. This follows the 
approach in civil proceedings on the subject of 
limitation from the long-standing precedent of 
Thompson v Brown Construction [1981] 2 All ER 
296, where the possibility of pursuing a claim 
against negligent solicitors was a relevant factor 
in refusing to disapply the time limit.
Early conciliation
The operation of early conciliation as a pre- 
action requirement has led to a number of 
important decisions. 
In Science Warehouse Ltd v Mills [2016] IRLR  
96, the EAT ruled that a claimant seeking an 
amendment to add a new claim to existing 
tribunal proceedings was not obliged to go 
through Acas early conciliation for this fresh 
claim. Compass Group UK & Ireland Ltd v Morgan 
[2016] UKEAT 0060_16_2607 is analogous. Here, 
an employee resigned after a certificate had been 
issued by Acas and sought to claim constructive 
dismissal. The tribunal did have jurisdiction and  
a second conciliation period was unnecessary. 
Mist v Derby Community Health Services NHS 
Trust [2016] ICR 543 is an EAT case where it was 
held that an error by the employee claimant in 
naming the respondent could not prevent a 
subsequent claim from being accepted by the 
employment tribunal. Here, the claimant had 
named the second respondent correctly in the 
ET1 form, but as a result of complications owing 
to the transfer of an undertaking, it had not been 
named in the Acas early conciliation certificate. 
Notably, HHJ Eady QC stated that the 
requirement of section 18A of the Employment 
Tribunals Act 1996 (as amended) is to ‘provide 
prescribed information to Acas before presenting 
an application to the ET.  This will include the 
prospective respondent’s name and address… The 
requirement is not for the precise or full legal title; 
it seems safe to assume (for example) that a trading 
name would be sufficient.  The requirement is 
designed to ensure Acas is provided with sufficient 
information to be able to make contact with the 
prospective respondent if the claimant agrees such 
an attempt to conciliate should be made… I do not 
read it as setting any higher bar.’
In relation to bringing tribunal proceedings 
against additional parties not named in the 
original early conciliation certificate, in Drake 
International Systems Ltd and others v Blue Arrow 
Ltd [2016] ICR 445, the EAT held that rule 34 of  
the 2013 Rules permits a tribunal to exercise its 
discretion in favour of the claimant in making 
what is essentially a case management decision. 
Here, the link between the original intended 
respondent (the parent company) and the four 
subsequently selected respondents was close. 
The discretion must consider the overriding 
objective as well as the ‘relevance, reason, justice, 
and fairness inherent in all judicial discretions’.  
In reaching this decision, Langstaff J noted that a 
contrary decision would have created ‘a real risk 
that satellite litigation in respect of the provisions 
of early consideration might proliferate’.
Tanveer v East London Bus and Coach Company 
Ltd [2016] ICR D11 in the EAT establishes that the 
one-month extension to the relevant time limit as  
a result of Acas early conciliation conforms to the 
‘corresponding date’ rule from Dodds v Walker 
[1981] 1 WLR 1027. In other words, where an early 
conciliation certificate was issued on 30 June 2015, 
the extension runs to 30 July 2015, namely ‘the day 
of that month that bears the same number as the 
day of the earlier month on which the notice was 
given or the specified event occurred’.
The underlying theme is that while satellite 
litigation on the specific meaning of the early 
conciliation requirements is to be discouraged, 
generally speaking the employment tribunal  
can expect for time limits and other procedural 
requirements to be complied with. Where 
particulars are required, they should be provided, 
and where restrictions on reporting are set down, 
they are to be respected. Practitioners and 
litigants in person alike are expected to respect 
and follow time limits, directions, and orders or 
face the consequences.  SJ
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